#### FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

Chapter 8

# Outline

- $\diamond$  Why FOL?
- $\diamondsuit$  Syntax and semantics of FOL
- $\diamondsuit$  Fun with sentences
- $\diamondsuit$  Wumpus world in FOL

# Pros and cons of propositional logic

- Sectional logic is declarative: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- $\bigcirc$  Propositional logic is **compositional**: meaning of  $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$  is derived from meaning of  $B_{1,1}$  and of  $P_{1,2}$
- Meaning in propositional logic is context-independent (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
  E.g., cannot say "pits cause breezes in adjacent squares" except by writing one sentence for each square

# First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

. . .

- Objects: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- Relations: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . ., brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- Functions: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of

# Logics in general

Language	Ontological	Epistemological
	Commitment	Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief
Fuzzy logic	facts + degree of truth	known interval value

#### Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

ConstantsKingJohn, 2, UCB, ...PredicatesBrother, >, ...FunctionsSqrt, LeftLegOf, ...Variablesx, y, a, b, ...Connectives $\land \lor \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$ Equality=Quantifiers $\forall \exists$ 

#### Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence =  $predicate(term_1, ..., term_n)$ or  $term_1 = term_2$ 

> Term =  $function(term_1, ..., term_n)$ or constant or variable

#### Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

 $\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$ 

E.g.  $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$ > $(1, 2) \lor \leq (1, 2)$ > $(1, 2) \land \neg > (1, 2)$ 

# Truth in first-order logic


Sentences are true with respect to a model and an interpretation

Model contains  $\geq 1$  objects (domain elements) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for constant symbols  $\rightarrow$  objects predicate symbols  $\rightarrow$  relations function symbols  $\rightarrow$  functional relations

An atomic sentence  $predicate(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$  is true iff the objects referred to by  $term_1, \ldots, term_n$ are in the relation referred to by predicate

# Models for FOL: Example



# Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which  $Richard \rightarrow$  Richard the Lionheart  $John \rightarrow$  the evil King John  $Brother \rightarrow$  the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, Brother(Richard, John) is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

# Models for FOL: Lots!

Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to  $\infty$ For each k-ary predicate  $P_k$  in the vocabulary For each possible k-ary relation on n objects For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary For each choice of referent for C from n objects ...

Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

### **Universal quantification**

 $\forall \langle variables \rangle \ \langle sentence \rangle$ 

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:  $\forall x \ At(x, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$ 

 $\forall x \ P$  is true in a model m iff P is true with x being each possible object in the model

**Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

 $\begin{array}{l} (At(KingJohn, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(KingJohn)) \\ \land \ (At(Richard, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Richard)) \\ \land \ (At(Berkeley, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Berkeley)) \\ \land \ \dots \end{array}$ 

#### A common mistake to avoid

Typically,  $\Rightarrow$  is the main connective with  $\forall$ 

Common mistake: using  $\land$  as the main connective with  $\forall$ :

 $\forall x \; At(x, Berkeley) \land Smart(x)$ 

means "Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart"

# **Existential quantification**

 $\exists \langle variables \rangle \ \langle sentence \rangle$ 

Someone at Stanford is smart:  $\exists x \ At(x, Stanford) \land Smart(x)$ 

 $\exists x \ P$  is true in a model m iff P is true with x being some possible object in the model

**Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

 $\begin{array}{l} (At(KingJohn, Stanford) \land Smart(KingJohn)) \\ \lor \ (At(Richard, Stanford) \land Smart(Richard)) \\ \lor \ (At(Stanford, Stanford) \land Smart(Stanford)) \\ \lor \ \dots \end{array}$ 

#### Another common mistake to avoid

Typically,  $\land$  is the main connective with  $\exists$ 

Common mistake: using  $\Rightarrow$  as the main connective with  $\exists$ :

 $\exists x \; At(x, Stanford) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$ 

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

#### **Properties of quantifiers**

- $\forall x \ \forall y \text{ is the same as } \forall y \ \forall x \ (why??)$
- $\exists x \exists y \text{ is the same as } \exists y \exists x (why??)$
- $\exists x \ \forall y$  is **not** the same as  $\forall y \ \exists x$
- $\exists x \ \forall y \ Loves(x,y)$

"There is a person who loves everyone in the world"

 $\forall y \; \exists x \; Loves(x,y)$ 

"Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person"

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

- $\forall x \ Likes(x, IceCream) \qquad \neg \exists x \ \neg Likes(x, IceCream)$
- $\exists x \ Likes(x, Broccoli) \qquad \neg \forall x \ \neg Likes(x, Broccoli)$

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 $\forall x,y \ Sibling(x,y) \Leftrightarrow Sibling(y,x).$ 

One's mother is one's female parent

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One's mother is one's female parent

 $\forall x,y \ Mother(x,y) \ \Leftrightarrow \ (Female(x) \land Parent(x,y)).$ 

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

Brothers are siblings

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One's mother is one's female parent

 $\forall x, y \ Mother(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (Female(x) \land Parent(x, y)).$ 

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

 $\begin{array}{lll} \forall x,y \ \ FirstCousin(x,y) \ \Leftrightarrow \ \exists \, p,ps \ \ Parent(p,x) \land Sibling(ps,p) \land \\ Parent(ps,y) \end{array}$ 

# Equality

 $term_1 = term_2$  is true under a given interpretation if and only if  $term_1$  and  $term_2$  refer to the same object

- E.g., 1 = 2 and  $\forall x \times (Sqrt(x), Sqrt(x)) = x$  are satisfiable 2 = 2 is valid
- E.g., definition of (full) Sibling in terms of Parent:  $\forall x, y \ Sibling(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \land \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \land$  $Parent(m, x) \land Parent(f, x) \land Parent(m, y) \land Parent(f, y)]$

#### Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at t = 5:

Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5)) $Ask(KB, \exists a \ Action(a, 5))$ 

I.e., does KB entail any particular actions at t = 5?

Answer: *Yes*,  $\{a/Shoot\} \leftarrow$  substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution  $\sigma$ ,  $S\sigma$  denotes the result of plugging  $\sigma$  into S; e.g., S = Smarter(x, y)  $\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$  $S\sigma = Smarter(Hillary, Bill)$ 

Ask(KB,S) returns some/all  $\sigma$  such that  $KB \models S\sigma$ 

#### Knowledge base for the wumpus world

"Perception"

 $\begin{array}{ll} \forall \, b, g, t \; \; Percept([Smell, b, g], t) \; \Rightarrow \; Smelt(t) \\ \forall \, s, b, t \; \; Percept([s, b, Glitter], t) \; \Rightarrow \; AtGold(t) \end{array}$ 

 $\mathsf{Reflex:} \ \forall t \ AtGold(t) \ \Rightarrow \ Action(Grab, t)$ 

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?  $\forall t \ AtGold(t) \land \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$ 

Holding(Gold, t) cannot be observed  $\Rightarrow$  keeping track of change is essential

# **Deducing hidden properties**

Properties of locations:

 $\begin{array}{ll} \forall x,t \ At(Agent,x,t) \land Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x) \\ \forall x,t \ At(Agent,x,t) \land Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x) \end{array}$ 

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:


 $\forall y \ Breezy(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \ Pit(x) \land Adjacent(x,y)]$ 

### Keeping track of change

Facts hold in situations, rather than eternally E.g., Holding(Gold, Now) rather than just Holding(Gold)

Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL: Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate E.g., Now in Holding(Gold, Now) denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the Result function Result(a, s) is the situation that results from doing a in s



# **Describing actions I**

"Effect" axiom—describe changes due to action  $\forall s \ AtGold(s) \Rightarrow Holding(Gold, Result(Grab, s))$ 

"Frame" axiom—describe **non-changes** due to action  $\forall s \; HaveArrow(s) \Rightarrow HaveArrow(Result(Grab, s))$ 

Frame problem: find an elegant way to handle non-change

- (a) representation—avoid frame axioms
- (b) inference—avoid repeated "copy-overs" to keep track of state

Qualification problem: true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats what if gold is slippery or nailed down or . . .

Ramification problem: real actions have many secondary consequences what about the dust on the gold, wear and tear on gloves, ...

# **Describing actions II**

Successor-state axioms solve the representational frame problem

Each axiom is "about" a **predicate** (not an action per se):

P true afterwards  $\Leftrightarrow$  [an action made P true  $\lor$  P true already and no action made P false]

#### For holding the gold:

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall a,s \ Holding(Gold,Result(a,s)) \Leftrightarrow \\ [(a = Grab \wedge AtGold(s)) \\ \lor (Holding(Gold,s) \wedge a \neq Release)] \end{array}$ 

# Making plans

Initial condition in KB:  $At(Agent, [1, 1], S_0)$  $At(Gold, [1, 2], S_0)$ 

Query:  $Ask(KB, \exists s \ Holding(Gold, s))$ i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

Answer:  $\{s/Result(Grab, Result(Forward, S_0))\}$ 

i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at  $S_0$  and that  $S_0$  is the only situation described in the KB

#### Making plans: A better way

Represent plans as action sequences  $[a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n]$ 

PlanResult(p,s) is the result of executing p in s

Then the query  $Ask(KB, \exists p \ Holding(Gold, PlanResult(p, S_0)))$  has the solution  $\{p/[Forward, Grab]\}$ 

Definition of PlanResult in terms of Result:  $\forall s \ PlanResult([], s) = s$  $\forall a, p, s \ PlanResult([a|p], s) = PlanResult(p, Result(a, s))$ 

Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

#### Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Situation calculus:

- conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
- can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB